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THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE: AKE v. OKLAHOMA,
470 U.S. 68 (1985)
KEviN T. SMITH*
Ake v. Oklahoma I marks yet another step in the development of pro-
tections for the indigent defendant.2 Society has moved from the pau-
per's prison to offering indigent defendants a transcript,' assistance of
counsel4 and the aid of a psychiatrist.5 Its impact is subtle yet significant.
The defense bar is now able to stock its argument arsenal with what may
prove to be extremely effective ammunition. The United States Supreme
Court "has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his de-
fense."6 Such a belief is enhanced by this ruling.7
This note will give a historical perspective of this area of the law and
analyze both Justice Marshall's opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in light of this perspective. The note will conclude with a discussion of
the impact and significance of the case.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Glen Burton Ake was charged8 with two counts of first degree mur-
* Attorney-At-Law, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice; former clerk for the Honora-
ble Phillip Grauccio, J.A.D., Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division; former Editor-in-
Chief Marquette Law Review.
1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The case name in the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals was Ake v.
State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. granted sub nomL Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099
(1984).
2. See infra note 32.
3. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
5. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
6. Id. at 77.
7. "This elementary principal, grounded in significant part on the fourteenth amendment's
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate mean-
ingfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake." Id.
8. In mid-October of 1979, Glen Burton Ake and his accomplice, Steven Hatch, entered a
home in Canadian County, Oklahoma for the purpose of burglarizing it. The home belonged to the
Reverend Richard Douglass, his wife Marilyn, and the two children, Brooks, age sixteen, and Leslie,
age twelve, all of whom were home. The parents and Brooks were bound and gagged faced down on
the floor while Ake and Hatch attempted to rape Leslie. Leslie then joined her family on the floor.
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der 9 and two counts of shooting with the intent to kill."0 Ake's conduct
was so disruptive and bizarre at the arraignment that the court, sua
sponte, ordered him to be examined by a psychiatrist in order to deter-
mine his competency to stand trial." I It was determined at a competency
hearing that Ake was mentally ill' 2 and as a result he was transferred to a
state mental hospital. There he was treated and diagnosed to be compe-
tent to stand trial so long as he maintained medication of Thorazine, a
major tranquilizer for psychotics.13
At a pretrial conference, Ake's attorney informed the court that the
insanity defense would be raised and requested the State either to arrange
for a psychiatrist to examine Ake or to provide funds allowing the de-
fense to arrange for one. 4 The motion was denied.
Ake was tried and convicted on all four counts. 5 His sole defense was
insanity. Ake's attorney continually protested that Ake was unable to
assist in his defense because he was sedated by Thorazine. Thorazine is
used on people who are psychotic, as opposed to neurotic. The drug
makes a normal person extremely drowsy with a single dose. The dosage
administered to Ake was triple that strength. Ake remained mute
throughout the trial. He refused to converse with his attorney, and
stared straight ahead during both stages of the proceeding. 6 Two exam-
ining psychiatrists and one physician were brought by the defense as wit-
nesses but could not express an opinion on Ake's sanity at the time of the
offense because they had only examined him for competency to stand
trial. The State put on twenty-three witnesses to establish Ake's guilt
and repeatedly attempted to rebut any notion of insanity. "As a result,
there was no expert testimony for either side on Ake's sanity at the time of
the offense."' 7
Ake told Hatch to go out and start the car. Ake then shot all four members of the Douglass family,
killing Rev. and Mrs. Douglass.
Ake and Hatch then fled through parts of the south and much of the western half of the United
States. They were arrested in Colorado in November, 1979, and returned to Oklahoma. Ake v.
State, 663 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
9. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 (1976).
10. Id., § 652 (1971).
11. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Ake v. State, 663 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cerL granted sub
nom. Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984), rev'd 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
12. For a discussion on incompetency and the standard for determining competency to stand
trial see generally, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 208 (1984).
13. Brief of the Petitioner at 4, Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). See Good-
man and Gillman's, The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics 403 (A. Gillman, L. Goodman, F.
Murad & T. Rall, 7th ed. 1985).
14. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 72.
15. "The jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder counts, and to 500 years
imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill." Id. at 73.
16. Brief of the Petitioner at 10, Ake v. State, 664 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), see also Ake
v. State, 663 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
17. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 72 (emphasis in original).
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The basis of the appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
was that Ake had a constitutional right to a court-appointed psychiatrist
to enhance effective assistance of counsel.18 The court disagreed, holding
that the State had no such responsibility.19
The United States Supreme Court 0 reversed and remanded for a new
trial. The Court held that when a defendant has made a preliminary
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a signifi-
cant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that the State provide access
to a psychiatrist's assistance on the issue, if the defendant cannot other-
wise afford one.2"
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the right
to have the assistance of counsel for one's defense, guaranteed by the
sixth amendment, was of such fundamental character as to be embodied
in the concept of due process of law as set forth in the fourteenth amend-
ment. 2 The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "23 In Boddie v. Connecticut,'4 the Court held that "due process
requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and
duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportu-
nity to be heard."2 5 The constitutional provision requires that the state
appellate system be "free of unreasoned distinctions,"2 6 and "that indi-
gents have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within
the adversary system."'27 Both rich and poor should be afforded due pro-
cess through equal access and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. No
distinction between classes should be made.
18. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
19. Id. at 6.
20. The United States Supreme Court granted Ake's motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and his petition for a writ of certiorari, Ake v. Oklahoma, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
21. Ake, 470 U.S. at 74.
22. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932); see also LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1098 (E.
Corwin, ed. 1953). Due Process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Rather it is "flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972).
23. U.S. Const. amend. XVI; see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 5 (1981).
24. 402 U.S. 371 (1971).
25. Id. at 377 quoted with approval in Streater, 452 U.S. at 5-6.
26. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
27. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487 (1963); Griffn v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
3
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A. The Indigent Defendant
The fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness is derived "from the belief that justice cannot be equal where,
simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to
participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at
stake."28 "Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central
aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so
far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar of justice
in every American court."2 9 This judicial goal is aimed at the indigent
defendant30 who will otherwise not be afforded equality before the law.
Indigence has given rise to many protective devices. In Griffin v. Illi-
nois,3" the Supreme Court held that once a state offers criminal defend-
ants the opportunity to appeal their cases, it must provide a trial
transcript to the indigent defendant if the transcript is necessary to a
decision on the merits of the appeal. The Court has since held that an
indigent defendant may not be required to pay a fee before filing a notice
of appeal of his conviction.32 An indigent defendant is entitled to the
assistance of counsel at trial33 and on his first direct appeal as of right.3 4
Furthermore, such assistance must be effective.3 The interwoven theme
of these cases is a meaningful access36 by the indigent defendant.37
The Court in Ake professed meaningful access to justice but then diffi-
culties arose. The Court recognized that:
mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper
functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is funda-
mentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant with-
28. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 76.
29. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. See also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
30. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 695 (5th ed. 1979) defines an indigent defendant as "a person
indicted or complained of who is without funds or ability to hire a lawyer to defend him and who, in
most instances, is entitled to appointed counsel."
31. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
33. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
35. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The question then arises, whether
counsel's conduct which is caused by the State's refusal to provide psychiatric assistance, can be held
to be ineffective.
36. This principle of meaningful participation has been extended to the extent that a state in a
"quasi-criminal" proceeding such as a paternity action cannot deny the putative father blood group-
ing tests, if he cannot otherwise afford them. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). For a discussion
on the meaning of the term "meaningful access," see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). See also
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974).
37. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 77.
4
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out making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense.38
The Court has not held that a State must provide an indigent defendant
with all the tools and material to which his wealthier counterpart may
have access.3 9 It has often reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles
indigent defendants to access sufficient for a fair presentation of their
claims.4 To implement this principle, the Court has focused on provid-
ing "indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal"4 and has required that such tools be provided to those defend-
ants who cannot afford to pay for them.4 2 Herein lies the difficulty.
B. The Indigent's Sanity
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,4 3 the Court held that the State
had no duty under any constitutional mandate to appoint a psychiatrist
to make a pretrial examination.' The Court at that time did not view a
psychiatric examination as a tool necessary for an adequate defense.4 5
Although there Is little doubt that the State must provide an adequate
means by which an accused can raise the issue of insanity,4 6 "it has also
been decided that federal district courts need not inquire again into the
mental fitness of a state prisoner on habeas corpus where the question has
been satisfactorily 'canvassed' by the State."'4 7 Where a state prisoner
raises the question of his mental competence to stand trial or his sanity at
the time of the offense, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment does not compel the state to employ any particular legal standard
to determine either the sanity at the time of the offense4 8 or of compe-
tence to stand trial.49 Baldi 50 requires a competency hearing if the issue
of sanity is raised. The test of whether the hearing constituted a denial of
38. Id.
39. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
40. See supra note 22.
41. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
42. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 76, 77. See also Jackson v. Estelle, 672 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.
1982).
43. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
44. Id. at 568.
45. Id. The Court stated, "psychiatrists testified. That suffices." United States ex rel Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U.S. at -. The defense in Baldi had no technical pretrial assistance and the psychiatrists
who examined, although court-appointed, were not there to assist the defense. It is hard to see how
an adequate defense could result from this.
46. Id. at 568, 570.
47. Pannell v. Cunningham, 302 F.2d 633, 634 (4th Cir. 1962); see also United States ex rel
Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 570; Hollis v. Ellis, 261 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1958); Jones v. Pescor, 73 F.
Supp. 297 (W.D. Mo. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 169 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1948).
48. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952).
49. Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Urbano v. State of
New Jersey, 225 F. Supp. 798, 805 (D.N.J. 1964).
50. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
5
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due process is whether it caused a denial of "that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice."51
Case law centers on whether the competency hearings were sufficient
to determine sanity and thus the competency issue. In Ake, state psychi-
atrists conducted examinations and rendered a decision. These psychia-
trists can be called to testify at trial but only their reports are used for
preparation.
C. Procedural Devices for Obtaining Psychiatric Assistance
Prior to Ake there were four separate procedural devices52 available
for use by the defendant in an effort to obtain psychiatric assistance.53
Each devise was designed to aid the indigent defendant, but their effect in
practice was minimal.
Congress enacted a "statutory remedy for discovering, treating and
disposing of persons found to be mentally ill and unable to stand trial."54
"Although the statutes are primarily designed for the mentally incompe-
tent, they are often used by both the defense and the prosecution as a
device to determine the mental condition of the defendant at the time of




Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 allows the court
to appoint an expert, either agreed upon by the parties or one of its own
selection. The expert is required to advise both parties of his findings and
can be called by either party to testify. The primary function of Rule 28
51. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (a state's refusal of a request to engage
counsel violates due process); (quoting Lisenda v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941) (as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe "that fundamental
fairness essential to the very concept of justice.")).
52. these four procedural devices are (1) 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-4248 (1982), "a procedure primar-
ily designed to discover and dispose of incompetents both before and during trial;" (2) FED. R.
CRIM. P. 28 "which provides, a method by which the court can appoint expert witnesses;" (3) FED.
R. CRIM. P. 17(b) "which extends the power of subpoena to indigent defendants;" and (4) 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1982), more commonly known as the Criminal Justice Act, which provides, in substance,
funds for furnishing an indigent with counsel and "administrative, expert or other services." Lewin,
Mental Disorder and the Federal Indigent, 11 S.D.L. Rv. 198, 200 (1966) (hereinafter cited as
Lewin).
53. Lewin, supra note 52, at -. Travis Lewin gives an indepth look into this area of the law.
Historical background along with procedural pitfalls and suggestions are provided. The purpose of
the article is to provide an understanding of the mechanics of the various pretrial examination proce-
dures and to suggest the expanded use of such psychiatric expertise for purposes other than the
pursuit of a full defense to the crime charged when the attorney believes that the only possible
defense is insanity.
54. Lewin, supra note 52, at 202. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247 (1982). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48
(Supp. III 1985). See also Lewin, supra note 52, at 202 n. 17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48 was substantially
changed in 1984.
55. Lewin, supra note 52, at 202-03. (Footnotes omitted).
56. Rule 28 is now a rule concerning interpreters. FED. R. EVID. 706 is the rule that covers
court-appointed experts. There were amendments and revisions, but the critical language remains
unchanged.
6
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is to enable the court to reach a proper decision rather than to aid an
indigent defendant in preparing his case." It is this philosophy that min-
imizes the use of the rule. 8
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b)59 provides in substance that
the court may at any time issue a subpoena on the motion of an indigent
defendant.60 The courts have severely restricted its use by saying that it
is not a devise of discovery and by refusing to let it be used by a defend-
ant fishing for an insanity defense.61
The primary purpose of the Criminal Justice Act62 was to provide pay-
ment for appointed counsel for the accused.63 Subsection (e) of the Act
provides that counsel for "a defendant who is financially unable to obtain
investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense
in his case" may request such services ex parte.11 Thus, Congress has
done more than provide compensation for an attorney, it has given every
defendant, rich or poor, an opportunity to develop fully every possible
defense.6 5 Through subsection (e) Congress has emphasized "that the
defendant needed partisan experts (including psychiatrists) and that it
intended to insure the availability of such experts to every defendant
without regard to his ability to pay."
66
It would appear that the indigent defendant has a loaded arsenal. Ake
is the additional weapon needed to give the indigent defendant ground on
which to stand and fight.
III. ANALYSIS
Benjamin Cardozo wrote "that upon the trial of certain issues, such as
insanity..., experts are often necessary both for the prosecution and for
defense.... A defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is un-
able because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those
57. Lewin, supra note 52, at 215.
58. Id
59. Rule 17(b) was amended in 1966 and it appears that Lewin's article reflects the changes.
There have been no subsequent changes.
60. See Lewin, supra note 52, at 218. If Rule 17(b) was not so restricted it should be used by
the defendant to call a psychiatrist to testify or by the court to order the psychiatrist to examine the
defendant. Since it has been limited, there is no significance to the decision being discussed here
except to know that such a device is available.
61. Id. at 219. See also id. at 219, nn.103, 104 & 107.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982). The Criminal Justice Act has been revised since Lewin's article,
but its general effect and impact is the same for our purpose. For the various amendments, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West Supp. 1985).
63. See Lewin, supra note 52, at 221.
64. Id. at 221-222.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id.
7
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against him."'6 7 The holding in Ake v. Oklahoma68 recognizes this disad-
vantage. The Court held that once the indigent defendant makes a pre-
liminary showing that sanity at the time of the offense will be a
significant factor at trial, he has a constitutional right to the assistance of
a psychiatrist in the preparation of his defense.69
A. Marshall's Opinion
The majority opinion provides significant support for the insanity de-
fense for the indigent defendant which strengthens the arsenal of defenses
available to him. Ake establishes case law and constitutional backing for
the Criminal Justice Act.7" In subsection (e) of the Criminal Justice Act,
Congress has provided that indigent defendants shall receive the assist-
ance of all experts "necessary for an adequate defense."'" Numerous
state statutes and case law interpreting state or federal constitutions have
required that psychiatric assistance be provided to indigent defendants.72
These statutes and court decisions reflect a reality that the Court recog-
nizes today, namely, that when the State has made the defendant's
mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punish-
ment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial
to the defendant's ability to marshal a defense.73
Establishing a constitutional basis for the Criminal Justice Act, specifi-
cally the appointing of experts, provides the indigent with firm ground to
stand on when making a motion requesting psychiatric assistance.
The decision also fosters impartiality of the expert witness. In Ake the
defendant was examined by state-appointed psychiatrists who were avail-
able to both the State and the defense. None of the doctors were answer-
able to the defense nor were they available to the defense for
consultation.74 "The opinion of the psychiatric expert alone may be the
decisive determinant of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Impartial
67. Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 116 N.E. 165, 167 (1929). See also Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 at 82 n.8.
68. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
69. Id. at 83.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
71. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79-80.
72. For a compilation of these statutes and cases, see Ake, 470 U.S. at 78 n.4. Wis. STAT.
§ 971.16(1) (1983-84) provides in part that the state can appoint a physician to examine the defend-
ant if the plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect is entered or if it otherwise becomes
an issue in the case. Compensation of the physician is fixed by the court and paid by the county.
There is no indication in the statute that the physician is required to be available to the defense for
consultation, but it is held as practice that if the physician's report is favorable to the defense they
will keep in contact with him if any questions or problems arise. Telephone interview with Patrick
Knight, Wisconsin State Public Defender's Office, Milwaukee County (June 28, 1985).
73. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
74. Psychiatric judgments are not really comparable to opinions of technical experts or even
other medical experts. Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some Comments
Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 L. & PSYCH. REv. 99,
8
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psychiatric testimony, unlike other kinds of expertise received by courts,
results in a trial by the expert."75 The Court recognized that providing
the defendant with an independent psychiatrist comports with our adver-
sarial system. The State had an unfair advantage which caused a depri-
vation of due process. Recognition of such a right is necessary to
deciding criminal responsibility in our adversary system.
76
In recognizing this right, the Court also acknowledges that psychiatry
is not an exact science. Psychiatrists frequently differ on what consti-
tutes mental illness, on their diagnosis of symptoms and the treatments
to accompany the problem, and the likelihood of future dangerousness.77
This creates a problem that should be unraveled by the finder of fact.
Juries remain the primary fact finders on this issue.78 It is proper to
leave such an issue in their hands so that they can resolve the differences
of opinion presented by each party's psychiatrist.79 When jurors are
asked to make such a determination, it is crucial that a plea of insanity
can be properly presented with the aid of psychiatric assistance.
The Court in Ake highlights the importance of psychiatric assistance
where insanity is a substantial issue:
[b]y organizing a defendant's mental history, examination results and be-
havior, and other information, interpreting it in light of their expertise,
and then laying out their investigative and analytical process to the jury,
the psychiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate
determination of the truth on the issue before them. It is for this reason
that States rely on psychiatrists as examiners, consultants, and witnesses,
and that private individuals do as well, when they can afford to do so."0
Unlike lay witnesses, psychiatrists are trained to identify the "elusive
and often deceptive" symptoms of insanity and relay their relevancy to
the jury.8 1 The psychiatrist can also translate medical terminology into
understandable and meaningful information. Where the liberty of an in-
dividual is at stake, the jury's clear understanding of the issue is critical.
The holding in Ake "assures the defendant access to a competent psy-
chiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in eval-
113-16 (1976) hereinafter Gardner. "Scientific objectivity is lacking in the findings of the psychiatric
witness." Id. at 114.
75. Id. at 114-15.
76. Id. at 115-16.
77. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
78. Id.
79. The evidentiary and procedural rules concerning psychiatric expert testimony are impor-
tant to consider when dealing with these issues. For a discussion on the admissibility of such expert
testimony, see Comment, The Psychiatric Expert in the Criminal Trial: Are the Bifurcation and the
Rules Concerning Opinion Testimony on Ultimate Issues Constitutionally Compatible?, 70 MARQ. L.
REv. 493 (1987).
80. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81-82.
81. Id. at 80 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950)).
9
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uation, preparation, and presentation of the defense." 82  The
appointment of a psychiatrist to the defendant merely for examination
purposes does not lend any support to the defendant in structuring or
arguing his defense. 3 It is obvious that the Court recognized the need of
counsel to have access to a psychiatrist when preparing and presenting
his case. With the assistance of a psychiatrist, vigorous cross-examina-
tion exposing weaknesses of the testimony of the court-appointed psychi-
atrist can be conducted by the defense in the best traditions of the
adversary process. 84 By allowing the psychiatrist, who has been provided
at state expense, to participate in structuring and presenting of the de-
fense, the Court has provided the indigent defendant with a weapon
which affords him the opportunity of utilizing the defense of insanity to
its utmost. It should be noted, however, that the Court held that the
indigent defendant has no "constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist
of his own personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own."85 He
cannot go "fishing" for a favorable opinion.
In dicta, the Court extended the ruling to the issue of future danger-
ousness. Without a psychiatrist's assistance, the defendant cannot offer a
well-informed expert's opposing view, and thereby loses a significant op-
portunity to raise questions in the jurors' minds about the State's proof of
an aggravating factor.86 In circumstances where the consequences are so
great, due process requires the availability of psychiatric assistance.
Although the decision benefits the indigent defendant in a significant
way, the Court falls short by leaving an important issue unresolved. The
question arises as to what extent a defendant must demonstrate that his
sanity will be a substantial factor at trial. The Court held that "when a
defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the
offense is to a significant factor at trial" the State must provide him with
a competent psychiatrist.87 The Court in the majority opinion called this
a "preliminary showing,"88 or a "demonstration,"89 and one of the dis-
senting opinions referred to it as an "ex parte threshold showing."9 0 It
appears that the Court has reserved this determination as to the extent of
82. 470 U.S. at 83.
83. An examination yields a report. The report, no matter what significance it may have, can
only be used for what is on its face. A psychiatrist can assist counsel in interpreting and utilizing the
report. Unless the appointed counsel is also a psychiatrist, he most likely will not have the under-
standing or insight necessary for a full utilization of the report. Psychiatric assistance'can anticipate
questions of opposing counsel and formulate questions and rebutting arguments for cross-
examination.
84. See Gardner, supra note 74, at 116.
85. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 74.
89. Id. at 83.
90. Id at 82.
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the showing to the individual states. This may do more harm than good.
The states may require such a stringent showing that the purpose of the
holding will be eroded. By better defining the issue and devising some
criteria for its resolution, the Court could have assured the holding's
proper application. It seems clear that the Court is not requiring a "be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard." A preponderance standard of proof
is more appropriate and more proper. Proper in limine motions and
other applicable pre-trial proceedings would be essential to the fair deter-
mination of this issue.
The application of Ake causes a similar problem. In such a prelimi-
nary showing, can the defendant properly raise the issue of insanity at
the time of the offense without the assistance of a psychiatrist? The stan-
dard for demonstrating to the trial judge the significance of the issue
must be flexible enough to allow the Ake decision to carry some weight,
yet not so flexible as to encourage an abuse of the process. If competency
is questioned, the defense should request that both competency to stand
trial and the mental state at the time of the offense be determined in
order that he might have some ammunition to support his application for
psychiatric assistance at the trial phase. Oklahoma recognizes a defense
of insanity, under which the initial burden of producing evidence falls on
the defendant.91 Without any psychiatric assistance, the defense may
never meet this burden.
92
Therefore, the Ake decision93 is weak in that it does not better define
the extent of the showing necessary to assure appointment of a psychia-
trist. Nor did the Court address the issue of the indigent defendant's
right to psychiatric assistance in trying to meet that initial burden of
producing evidence as to insanity. Discussing these issues would have
made the Court's opinion much more complete and would have made its
application more fruitful.
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 152 (1981). See also Ake, 470 U.S. n.1.
92. Such a law as Oklahoma's should be highly scrutinized when establishing the proper stan-
dard of showing in order to effect a proper balance of the interests of the individual and the State.
For a discussion of these interests of the individual and the State, see Ake v, Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at
76-80. Justice Marshall discusses three factors relevant to the importance of the participation of a
psychiatrist in the preparation of the defense.
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State. The second is the
governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the prob-
able value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. Id. at 77.
93. Chief Justice Burger concurred. He points out that "nothing in the decision reaches non
capital cases." Ake, 470 U.S. 69, 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Because of the value this society
places on its liberty it is possible that in the future this argument will be advanced in support of
psychiatric assistance in non-capital cases. It would appear, however, that there would have to be a
significant deprivation of liberty for the Ake holding to apply.
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B. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rhenquist "would limit the rule to capital cases, and make
clear that the entitlement is to an independent psychiatric evaluation, not
to a defense consultant."94 Rhenquist loses sight of the fact that an attor-
ney is not a psychiatrist, although he does point out that a psychiatrist is
not an attorney.95 Psychiatric assistance is needed to educate both coun-
sel and the jury. He writes that it should not be a violation of due pro-
cess if an indigent defendant cannot pursue a state-law defense as
thoroughly as he would like.96 This distinction between defendants
based merely on their wealth or lack of it clearly should not exist.
IV. IMPACT
The significance of the case is its recognition of the need for psychiatric
assistance in defense consultation when insanity is a substantial issue.
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional exam-
ination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether the
insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing
the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witness, the risk of an inac-
curate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high. 97
The decision also lends support to an ideology that our society holds.
Ake v. Oklahoma furthers the belief that man's freedom and liberty are
much too precious to allow their deprivation to occur merely because an
individual cannot afford defenses available to those with sufficient funds.
Ake will be added to such cases as Griffin v. Illinois98 and Gideon v.
Wainwright,99 perhaps not in stature but as a mark of the integrity of our
judicial system. It is not quite evident that Ake will have as resounding
an effect upon our criminal justice system as Griffin or Gideon have had.
But in terms of the ideology behind each of those cases, they are quite
equal.
It remains to be seen what the true impact will be. In time the applica-
tion of the decision will better define the standards set and refine any
procedural defects that may accompany it. One could only hope that in
time and in application, the defining and refining will manifest
themselves.
94. Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
95. See id at 92.
96. Ake, 470 U.S. 68 at 91 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
97. I at 82.
98. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
99. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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V. CONCLUSION
Ake v. Oklahoma "oo is a judicially honest and sensible decision. It was
previously held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance
of counsela01 and that such assistance must be effective.102 Ake enhances
these landmark decisions by providing the tools needed for an effective
application of an insanity plea by the defense counsel. The due process
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment has been protected. The indi-
gent defendant's defense arsenal has been built up. Time will tell
whether or not this weapon will protect the insane indigent from an im-
proper deprivation of liberty.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
Since the authoring of this article, many courts have cited Ake v.
Oklahoma 103 for a variety of reasons. Given the large volume of cases, it
will be of little help to the reader to cite each and every case. However,
what follows is a brief discussion of some of those cases which have made
significant and definitive statements about and interpretations of the
holding in Ake.
A large majority of the cases have cited Ake for its basic proposition,
that an indigent defendant has a right to psychiatric assistance in the
preparation of an insanity defense. A prerequisite to the right is that the
defendant make a threshold showing that sanity at the time of the offense
will be a significant factor at trial. Several cases have addressed the ques-
tion of what constitutes a threshold showing.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Gambrell 1o noted
the following:
In determining whether defendant has made a threshold showing re-
quired by Ake, the trial court should consider all the facts and circum-
stances known to it at the time the motion for psychiatric assistance is
made. It should not base its ruling on the opinion of one psychiatrist if
there are other facts and circumstances casting doubt on that opinion.
The question under Ake is not whether defendant has made aprimafacie
showing of legal insanity. The question is whether, under all the facts
and circumstances known to the court at the time the motion is made,
defendant has demonstrated that his sanity when the offense was commit-
ted will likely be at trial a significant factor.
10 5
That court has also required that the defendant demonstrate a specific
100. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
101. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
102. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
103. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
104. 318 N.C. 249, 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986).
105. Id. at 256, 347 S.E.2d at 394.
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necessity for an expert by showing a particularized need. °6
The Louisiana appellate court held that the fact that the defendant
pled not guilty by reason of insanity was not a sufficient showing."°7 The
Missouri Court of Appeals held that undeveloped assertions that psychi-
atric assistance would be beneficial would likewise be insufficient in Mis-
souri.108 It also held that allegations must be supported by a factual
showing that sanity will be a fact in issue. 10 9
The most significant of the state cases comes from the Georgia
Supreme Court. In Lindsey v. State,1 10 the court permitted trial judges to
grant motions for psychiatric examination for the preliminary stages of
the proceedings to aid defendants in determining whether sanity will be a
significant factor at trial.111 This is the only state case which takes an
affirmative approach in the interpretation and application of Ake. This is
obviously a critical step in the right direction. Yet, it lacks one key ele-
ment of significance. The underlying impact of Ake is to provide the
defendant with the assistance of a psychiatric expert. Although that deci-
sion is couched in terms of trial, its application precludes that assistance
if the appropriate showing is not achieved. Therefore, assistance must be
provided before trial, even at the preliminary stages of establishing a
threshold showing. Lindsey provides a psychiatric evaluation which cer-
tainly aids in establishing the threshold showing, but it is the assistance
in establishing that showing through help in preparation and cross-exam-
ination which is critical. To date, no state court has recognized that crit-
ical aspect.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Volson v. Blackburn 1 1 2 recog-
nized that "the Ake decision fails to establish a bright line test for deter-
mining when a defendant has demonstrated that sanity at the time of the
offense will be a significant factor at the time of trial." ' In that particu-
lar case, the defendant pled not guilty by reason of insanity to aggravated
rape. He argued that a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense will
always be a significant factor at trial when such a plea is entered. In not
reading Ake as broadly as the defendant, the court held that "Ake re-
quires that the defendant, at a minimum, make allegations supported by
a factual showing that the defendant's sanity is in fact at issue in the
case." 
114
106. See State v. Hickey, 317 N.C. 457, 468, 346 S.E.2d 646, 654 (1986).
107. See State v. Barbee, 499 So. 2d 1324, 1326-27 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
108. See Bannister v. State, 726 S.W.2d 821, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
109. See id. at 829.
110. 254 Ga. 444, 330 S.E.2d 563 (1985).
111. Id., at 449, 330 S.E.2d at 566.
112. 794 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 176.
114. Id.
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The tenth circuit discussed what constituted a necessary showing in
Cartwright v. Maynard.115
[I]f "sanity" or "mental capacity" defenses were to be defense issues,
they must be established by a "clear showing" by the indigent defendant
as "genuine," "real" issues in the case. In order for a defendant's mental
state to become a substantial threshold issue, the showing must be clear
and genuine, one that constitutes a "close" question which may well be
decided one way or the other. It must be one that is very debatable or in
doubt. 116
That case also established a standard of review when such questions are
raised on appeal. That standard is "whether, upon review of the entire
record, . . . defendant could have made a threshold showing under
Ake.,, 17
The eleventh circuit has addressed the question of whether Ake applies
to the sentencing stage. In Bowden v. Kemp,118 the court was faced with
a defendant who made no showing that insanity at the time of the offense
would be a significant factor at trial nor a request for psychiatric assist-
ance to aid in the presentation of mitigating factors at sentencing. The
court found no showing and seems to have held that a lack of an ade-
quate showing at trial precludes the assistance at sentencing.119 Later,
the eleventh circuit clarified that ruling in Thompson v. Wainwright 120
where it held that "Ake ... requires appointment of psychiatric assist-
ance only where a showing of need is made before trial."
121
What every court has missed when interpreting and applying Ake is
the necessity of independent psychiatric assistance in making the thresh-
old showing. Granted, there will be situations where the need for such
assistance is evident as the facts demonstrated in Ake. However, many
situations will not be as clear. Until courts recognize the critical neces-
sity of that assistance, defendants in unclear situations will be deprived of
the benefit of Ake.
Time has not been gracious to Ake. A narrow interpretation by the
courts has rendered its significance minimal. Until the courts recognize
this significance, Ake will remain as only a pop-gun in the defense arsenal
instead of a full-powered weapon in the fight for indigent's rights.
115. 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1211, citing United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985).
117. Id. at 1212.
118. 767 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1986).
119. See id. at 763-65.
120. 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1986).
121. Id. at 1459 (emphasis supplied).
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